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Introduction 
In May 2005, senior administrators at Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia National 
Laboratories issued a white paper titled “Sustaining the Nuclear Enterprise—a New Approach.”[1] 
The paper reflects the impact of the U.S. nuclear test moratorium, in place since 1992, and the 
growing incompatibility between two national objectives:  
(a) slowing horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation, and  
(b) preserving an effective U.S. nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future.  
The effects of the nuclear test moratorium, which have been reinforced by the 1996 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), have been mitigated in the United States by the 
Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which was intended to extend the service life of 
the U.S. nuclear stockpile. Despite the surety and maintenance programs embodied within 
stockpile stewardship, however, National Laboratory administrators warn that SSP is an 
expensive endeavor that will fail gracefully in the effort to extend the useful life of U.S. nuclear 
weapons.  
Whatever one’s views about the morality of nuclear deterrence or the desirability of nuclear 
disarmament, the challenges facing the SSP highlights the danger of failing to recognize value 
tradeoffs—the fact that opportunity costs are inherent in all actions—when formulating public 
policy.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, both the United States and Russia took steps to 
reduce their huge nuclear arsenals. Both countries possessed a surplus of nuclear weapons, and 
given their improving political relations, they had little motivation to continue with their existing 
nuclear force modernization programs. Forces were de-alerted, de-targeted and retired.  
As part of this nuclear draw down, the George H.W. Bush administration announced a unilateral 
testing moratorium on October 2, 1992 that was subsequently extended by the Clinton 
administration until the United States formally committed itself to halt nuclear testing by signing of 
the CTBT.[2]  
The Soviet Union/Russia conducted its last nuclear test in October 1990, Great Britain ended 
testing in November 1991, and France and China both conducted their last nuclear tests in 
January 1996. Although India and Pakistani conducted nuclear tests in 1998, the shock they 
delivered to the global nonproliferation regime was not sufficient to upset the test moratorium 
among the other nuclear powers. Despite ongoing concerns about North Korean and Iranian 
nuclear programs and revelations about A.Q. Khan’s clandestine nuclear supply network, the 
nuclear programs of the existing nuclear powers have exhibited diminishing levels of activity over 
the last decade.  
Nuclear test moratoria and more formal test-ban treaties are disarmament measures, although 
segments of the U.S. government have failed to recognize this reality. Government advocates of 
these measures often state that they are intended to stop the horizontal spread of nuclear 
weapons to new parties and vertical proliferation by halting nuclear force modernization among 
existing nuclear powers. They also claim that the United States could use advanced modeling 
and its existing nuclear research establishment to maintain a nuclear deterrent indefinitely. Over 
time, however, a testing moratorium will slowly undermine the capability of even the most 
advanced nuclear state to maintain a nuclear arsenal.  
Test-ban proponents, especially when addressing other disarmament supporters, often do admit 
that a test moratorium eventually will lead to disarmament, and trends support their theoretical 
observations and policy prescriptions. Nuclear physics and weapons engineering are living arts; 
know-how is learned from hands-on experience with real weapons and is passed along to the 
next generation of scientists and engineers as they work with their senior colleagues.  
A moratorium breaks this chain by effectively ending this apprentice system. Important knowledge 
also is lost as experienced engineers and scientists retire. Manufacturing and design knowledge 
can never be fully captured by blueprints or even in the most detailed commentary that might 
accompany design specifications. Without ongoing design and manufacturing work, maintenance 
of existing weapons becomes increasingly difficult as components become unavailable when 
suppliers go out of business or abandon product lines. Over a few short decades, the design, 
engineering, and manufacturing resources needed to maintain existing weapons begin to 
dissipate.  
To reap the nonproliferation benefits created by a nuclear testing moratorium, while still enjoying 
the security provided by a robust nuclear deterrent, the Clinton administration started the SSP. 
The SSP is intended to extend the life of Cold War surplus weapons by certifying their continued 
safety and functionality until 2040.  
By maintaining a large reserve of nuclear weapons, U.S. officials intended to guard against 
unforeseen technical problems in their deployed nuclear forces and to greatly reduce the U.S. 
weapons design and manufacturing infrastructure. Instead of building new nuclear weapons, the 
decision was made to retain the entire Cold War stockpile of certain types of nuclear weapons, 
maintaining them as long as possible to be prepared for unforeseen technical problems in the 
deployed nuclear arsenal or international contingencies (e.g., an effort by another great power to 
increase rapidly its deployed nuclear forces).  
This Life Extension Program (LEP) has already completed the refurbishment of the W87 warhead, 
designed for intercontinental-ballistic missiles. The W87 can now remain in the stockpile until 
2030. LEP also is underway to extend the service life of the B61 series of nuclear gravity bombs 
and the W76 warhead, which is deployed on submarine-launched ballistic missiles.  
The SSP program has worked reasonably well to date, but scientists and engineers have 
encountered a fundamental limitation in terms of extending the life of existing U.S. nuclear 
warheads. The last generation of U.S. nuclear warheads, which were designed in the early 1980s, 
was built to optimize yield-to-weight ratios. Because it was assumed that these weapons would 
only be in the stockpile for ten to twenty years before being replaced by a new generation of 
weapons, and because it was assumed that nuclear testing could be undertaken to guarantee 
their performance, they were constructed with high tolerances and relatively small performance 
margins.  
Additionally, some materials and manufacturing processes that were used thirty years ago are no 
longer commercially available, forcing engineers to begin to incorporate new processes and 
materials into refurbished warheads. Doubts are beginning to emerge about how the introduction 
of new components or systems might affect the performance of these weapons. In other words, 
the newest U.S. nuclear warheads are particularly ill-suited for service life extension; National 
Laboratory administrations are warning that the safety, reliability and performance of U.S. nuclear 
weapons will begin to deteriorate no matter how much time or money is expended to preserve 
them.  
The Bush administration’s first response to this situation, contained in the 2001 Nuclear Posture 
Review, was a call for a new nuclear triad, which would consist of active defenses, a robust 
nuclear infrastructure, and strike options that incorporated precision-conventional weapons into 
the strategic deterrent.[3] Simultaneously, administration officials proposed studies on new low-
yield, nuclear weapons that would be designed to hold deeply buried targets at risk or to minimize 
collateral damage in a U.S. nuclear strike, thereby increasing the credibility of U.S. nuclear 
deterrence.[4] But there was little Congressional support for production new nuclear warheads. 
The current White Paper issued by the National Laboratories thus marks a shift in the Bush 
administration’s approach to the issue of U.S. nuclear force modernization. Instead of advocating 
the construction of new warheads that fit a strategic concept or respond to perceived international 
threats (e.g., the spread of weapons of mass destruction to “rogue” states), the National 
Laboratories and the administration have admitted that the SSP and the LEP cannot maintain the 
current U.S. nuclear inventory indefinitely.  
Whether or not one considers the current dilemma faced by U.S. officials an intended or 
unintended consequence of decisions made by both Republican and Democratic administrations 
in the early 1990s, two observations can be offered about the current status of U.S. nuclear 
weapons maintenance and procurement policy. 
First, officials failed to recognize that there was a difference between the immediate and long-
term impact of the decision to suspend nuclear testing. The downsizing or retiring of significant 
portions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal at the end of the Cold War made perfect sense. Cutting 
spending on nuclear forces, terminating nuclear force modernization, and ending nuclear testing 
were all seen as part of the effort to retire Cold War surplus weapons. But suspending nuclear 
testing was more than just a good cost cutting measure, or part of an effort to abandon weapons 
that were no longer needed. Instead, it reduced the United States' capability to maintain and 
reconstitute a nuclear arsenal. A decision that seemed relatively innocuous turned out to be far 
more significant because officials failed to realize the long-term opportunity costs of their policy. 
Policymakers attempted to mitigate these opportunity costs through the SSP and LEP, but it now 
appears that the balance is beginning to tip fundamentally between the ability of the United States 
to pursue nuclear disarmament and deterrence simultaneously. In the end, it is impossible to 
disarm and remain armed at the same time.  
Second, policymakers apparently never understood how the technical characteristics of the latest 
generation of U.S. nuclear weapons actually made them poor candidates for SSP. Designed and 
built to create the maximum yield with minimum size and weight, U.S. nuclear weapons are 
probably some of the most complex and exacting machines ever created. Built from exotic 
materials and components that have little civilian application, they present engineers with 
significant maintenance challenges. To best prepare for nuclear force reductions and a nuclear 
test moratorium, scientists and engineers probably should have quickly designed and tested a 
new generation of nuclear warheads designed for easy maintenance, high security, and long 
service lifetimes. A decision to prepare for what amounted to gradual nuclear disarmament by 
developing a new nuclear weapon would have been difficult to explain, if not politically 
implausible in the early 1990s. Such a decision would have required an honest appraisal of the 
opportunity costs involved in the decision to abandon nuclear testing. But these types of 
assessments were not a pressing concern in the euphoria that accompanied the end of the Cold 
War.  
Will the scientists and engineers at the National Laboratories receive Congressional authorization 
and funding to construct a new generation of nuclear weapons? Can these weapons be built 
without testing? It is impossible to answer these questions, but it appears that an improved SSP 
that requires the design and construction of new nuclear weapons is unlikely to gain much 
support in the current political climate.  
But politics can change. A significant external shock—the resumption of nuclear testing by 
another party, the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by a state or non-state 
actor—could quickly change Congressional and public attitudes toward the U.S. nuclear program. 
Until then, officials will have to live with the fact that despite much rhetoric about deterrence and 
acute threats posed by the presence of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, disarmament 
is the dominant feature of U.S. nuclear policy. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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